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The Law's Response to 
Reproductive Genetic Testing: 
Questioning Assumptions about 
Choice, Causation and Control 
Abstract 
The law's response to reproductive genetic testing depends on 
a number of assumptions about choice, causation and control 
which need to be questioned. From the preconception stage 
forward, the illusion of choice may raise such fundamental 
questions as the woman's choice not to be tested. limits on 
genetic information, and the availability of reproductive op-
tions. In tum, assumptions about choice raise questions about 
the responsibility for results and the connection between 
choice and causation in the context of wrongful binh and life 
actions. Assumptions made about control over reproductive 
choice and over causing 'harm', will impact on the develop-
ment of future law. 
The law's response to reproductive genetic 
testing depends on a number of assumptions. 
It is time to reexamine assumptions that have 
shaped the expansion of reproductive genetic 
testing. This paper explores and questions 
assumptions made about the three 'Cs' -
choice, causation and control. 
what to know or what not to know. The choice 
to live with uncertainty or the choice to know 
for certain. The choice to carry a pregnancy to 
term or the choice to terminate the pregnancy. 
The legal and ethical principles that drive 
the debate in reproductive genetic testing de-
pend on the model of patient autonomy, right 
to privacy and choice. Nondirective counsel-
ing and the informed-consent process are 
based on our assumption that patient choice 
is given. Proponents of reproductive genetic 
testing argue that with more genetic informa-
tion there will be more choice. 
Choice 
Reproductive genetic testing assumes 
choice. The choice to become pregnant or the 
choice to forego pregnancy. The choice to have 
a test or not to have a test. The choice to decide 
But choice is not that simple. From the 
preconception stage forward. the illusion of 
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choice may raise fundamental questions. 
will highlight problems from preconception 
through birth that should shake our security 
over choice. Throughout this discussion it is 
imponant to point out that, for those women 
who have little or no access to prenatal care, 
genetic services are not available. For these 
women choice is not an option. 
( 1) In the ideal world. carrier screening 
prior to pregnancy is a joint responsibility of 
the couple. Obtaining information about 
probabilities of genetic risk may help to clar-
ify decision making about reproduction. This 
is a shared responsibility. However, once the 
decision is made to conceive with genetically 
linked sperm and egg, the responsibility shifts 
exclusively to the woman. This is so even if 
she is not the carrier of the risky genetic link. 
The decision to conceive. often tied to the 
need for genetic connection. shifts all genetic 
testing to the woman. She is the sole subject of 
testing. In this context, does she have a choice 
not to be tested? If she consented to precon-
ception testing, does she have a choice not to 
be tested once pregnant? Has she. waived her 
right to take her chances? . 
(2) Most genetic testing is done on women 
only during pregnancy. Men are yet to experi-
ence as a group the impact of such a massive 
screening effort. As testing becomes incorpo-
rated into prenatal care practice, are women 
presented with the choice to refuse such test-
ing? Providers. who set the standard of care, 
may feel they do not even have the option to 
give women a choice. Is it the fear of liabilitv 
that makes providers believe that they must 
provide genetic testing without discussing op-
tions with the pregnant woman? Yet if choice 
is our guiding principle, providers have the 
duty to set out the choices for testing, not just 
order tests without thought. Ironically. the 
more the profession buys into the expansion 
of genetic testing and increases consumer ex-
pectations. the more trapped the profession 
will become into providing the services. The 
profession has the power and the responsibil-
ity to question the risks and benefits of genetic 
testing in the broader context of comprehen-
sive pregnancy care. and in educating the pop-
ulation as to how infrequently genetic abnor-
malities contribute to the less than perfect 
baby. 
(3) If a woman makes an informed choice 
to be tested. can she place limits on the infor-
mation she wants to know? If not. she must be 
told ahead of time what conditions are being 
tested for and the limitations, if any, to test 
results. It would appear that a woman's choice 
to be tested need not prevent her from waiv-
ing knowledge about certain types of genetic 
information. 
( 4) Conflict of interest can impact on 
choice. Genetic counseling should not be a 
risk management session scheduled just prior 
to genetic testing in which the woman signs an 
informed consent form. Rather there should 
be separation between counseling and proce-
dures. Genetic counseling is a process sepa-
rate and apart from testing. Genetic counsel-
ors should not feel that they have failed them-
selves or their employers if a woman choos~s 
not to be tested. But that can often be the· 
financial result. In this situation the woman 
may only have the illusion of choice by parti-
cipating in a genetic counseling session just 
prior to a scheduled test. 
(5) During genetic counseling it must be 
clear what options a woman will have after 
receiving test results. Obviously. there is in-
creasing concern that. as genetic testing is 
expanding, the constitutional right to choose 
to terminate a pregnancy is contracting. The 
Webster [1) decision makes it more likely that 
each state will set its own rules for categoriz-
ing what conditions justify abortion. Some 
states will allow abortion for 'fetal defect'. 
congenital anomalies and the like. but as 
reproductive testing increases how will abor-
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tion legislation adjust? Such state law varia-
tion will require woman and providers in each 
state to adjust accordingly. For the future of 
reproductive genetic testing very much de-
pends on the future of the right to choose. 
Furthermore. the Rusr [2] decision con-
firms that the federal government may allow 
limits on the content of disclosure about abor-
tion in family planning programs. Even if some 
assume that medically indicated abortion may 
be discussed under certain conditions. it is 
clear that the Rust climate of silencing provid-
ers will further limit choice for the poor. partic-
ularly with respect to disclosure on genetic test-
ing and abortion services. Legal confusion of-
ten breeds further access problems for women. 
In fact. a number of states have inconsistent 
_ ~ laws and public policies which may fund ge-
.... netic services but not abortion. 
( 6) In addition to such barriers. the profes-
sion is responsible in practice for limiting 
choice by abandoning the care of the pregnant 
woman midstream. The medical profession 
needs to assure that either the providers mak-
ing the referral for genetic testing or those 
offering the genetic testing procedures pro-
vide for abortion services. The medical pro-
fession needs to bener coordinate such ser-
vices for the woman. At a time when training 
in genetic testing is expanding, training in 
abortion services among residency programs 
is decreasing. Without such continuity. the 
provider is in fact limiting choice for the 
woman. 
(7) Some women feel they have no choice 
but to abort because there is insufficient infor-
mation on prognosis. quality of life and ser-
vices for the disabled. And do those women 
who do not abort waive future support for 
children born with disabilities? This fear may 
be real as we hear reports of insurance compa-
nies and health maintenance organizations 
who threaten not to cover expenses for chil-
dren born by choice with genetic disorders. 
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Causation 
With choice comes responsibility for re-
sults. Reproductive genetic testing assumes a 
cause and effect. But causation in this context 
is very confusing. The questions raised by 
wrongful-birth and wrongful-life actions may 
help illustrate the connection between choice 
and causation. 
The wrongful-birth action assumes that. 
because the provider failed to disclose infor-
mation about genetic testing. or failed to pro-
vide the correct test result. the provider 
caused a harm that requires compensation to 
the mother (or parents) of a child born with a 
genetic disorder. The harm is not that the 
child was born with a genetic disorder. Rath-
er. the harm is that the mother was deprived 
of the right to know about a testable genetic 
condition and then could not exercise her 
right to choose whether to terminate the preg-
nancy. Obviously. if choice was not at issue. 
there might be no causation between the pro-
vider's negligence and the harm. 
On the other hand. most courts have been 
a lot less willing to recognize a wrongful-life 
action brought by a child born \vith a genetic 
disorder against the provider for the same 
negligent conduct. In this case. some courts 
cannot find a causal link. The provider does 
not have a 'duty to rescue· the fetus from 
being born. And what is in fact the harm to be 
compensated? To establish such a duty might 
require the court to value nonexistence over a 
life with disability. As noted above. the failure 
to provide genetic testing. for example. did 
not cause the genetic condition. And in this 
case. the provider is not depriving the child of 
a choice. In utero. the fetus did not have the 
choice to make. 
Of course. the courts have made assump-
tions about both choice and causation. In this 
context. could women (and parents) have a 
'duty to rescue· a fetus from being born with 
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disabilities? Does a woman have both a legal 
duty to discover genetic traits and to act to 
prevent the fetus from being born with a 
genetic disorder? At least one commentator 
has also characterized the failure to be tested 
(and to abort a fetus with a genetic disorder) 
as analogous to fetal or child abuse. To date, a 
few states. rejecting such a legal duty, specifi-
cally provide that there is no such action rec-
ognized under state law. 
Yet there has been a trend in other areas of 
maternal behavior to draw connections be-
tween maternal behavior and predictions that 
such behavior caused harm to the fetus. 
Threats of child abuse. criminal prosecutions 
and tort liability have been raised against 
women. for example, who use drugs and alco-
hol du•··ing pregnancy. Once we pinpoint 
blame on pregnant women for causing 'bad 
outcomes'. are we on a slippery slope? Partic-
ularly if we assume women have choices. 
some may argue that we should assign causal 
responsibility for women who give birth to 
children with genetic disorders. 
Control 
Ultimately. the expansion of reproductive 
genetic testing will be about control. Control 
over what choices get made. who makes them. 
and who judges them will directly influence 
how we shape to law's response. The assump-
tions we make about control over reproduc-
tive choice. and control over causing or pre-
venting 'hann'. will impact on the develop-
ment of future law. Will providers of genetic 
testing determine what genetic information is 
relevant to be tested for and disclosed in car-
rier screening programs and to pregnant 
women? What limitations will the govern-
ment place on the access to such information? 
What control will there be between access to 
genetic services. abortion services and/or sup-
port services for families and children with 
disabilities? What increase in control will laws 
give the medical profession to define 'fetal 
defect' and medical necessity for ·responsible' 
limits on abortion. Will the expansion in ge-
netic testing also signal the remedicalization 
of abortion as a social welfare or public health 
strategy? What control will the law maintain 
over a woman's right to conceive without 
prior genetic information and to carry a preg-
nancy to term without genetic testing? 
These questions do not have easy answers. 
Both providers and consumers must recog-
nize that there are limits on control. Most 
importantly. we cannot assume that we can 
control a pregnancy outcome. The expansion 
of genetic testing may assume we can, but in 
the end we must recognize that conditions 
beyond our knowledge or grasp may cause 
outcomes that we cannot control. Certainly 
law cannot change this reality. Once we real-
ize this fact we may be more willing to ques-
tion our assumptions and accept our limita-
tions. 
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